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Molander: Machiavellian Jurisprudence

MACHIAVELLIAN JURISPRUDENCE: THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S
DOCTRINAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL
SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION

Constitutional scholarship is currently reliving the great
Federalist/Anti-Federalist debate of 1787-88.1 The focus of this
discussion will be on whether or not Lockean liberal
individualism 2 was the central philosophical influence on the
Founders'
design. 3 Phrased differently,
contemporary
constitutional scholars have misgivings on whether Lockean
liberalism's
counter-ideology,
that
of classic
civic
republicanism, 4 has had more to do with American political and
1. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WNHIrE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Frank I. Michelman,
Symposium, Lav's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L.
REv. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). But see Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate
Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. Ray. 801 (1993); Martin H.
Redish, et. al., Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in
Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267
(1991).
2. See generally Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERacA:
ANALYSIS

AN

INTERPRETATION

OF

AimRICAN

POLITICAL

THOUGHT

SINCE

THE

REVOLUTION (1955). Lockean liberalism is founded on the notion of natural
rights, which are beyond the repressive control of the community. These
natural or personal rights exist prior to entering civil society, thus there are
limits to societal abrogation of these rights.
3. According to Louis Hartz, "[t]he national acceptance of the Lockean
creed [was] ultimately enshrined in the Constitution." HARTZ, supra note 2, at
9.
4. Civic republicanism is the concept that individual needs and interests
are subordinate to community interests. Therefore, the parameters of personal
behavior must comport with community values. For a more conceptual
difference between liberalism and republicanism, see Morton J. Horwitz,
Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 VM. &
MARY L. REV. 57 (1987).
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constitutional thought than previously believed. 5 Proponents of
this proposition argue that the American political philosophy,
from which the Constitution's genius sprung, is indebted to the
republican theorists of the Renaissance Era, 6 namely,
Machiavelli, 7 rather than European Enlightenment philosophers, 8
particularly John Locke. 9 The central thrust of this article will be
that the

Founding

Fathers

were

"confronted

[with]

two

[principal] traditions of political theory that exist[ed] in a
5. See BERNARD BAELYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION vii-xi, 22-35 (1967). Bernard Bailyn, the progenitor of this
recent scholarship, argued that the colonists were powerfully influenced by the
writings and traditions of the English common law, classical philosophical
thought, and New England Puritanism, in addition to those of Enlightenment
rationalism.
6. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 462-552

(1975) [hereinafter MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT]. Pocock's magisterial work on
republicanism posits that the American Revolution was the last of a series of
British revolutions, an episode in the history of the Renaissance and the early
modem era, not the first act in a new Age of Enlightenment that embraced
Lockean liberal individualism. Id.
7. Niccolo Machiavelli was born in 1469 and died in 1527. Two of his
more famous works are THE PRINCE and THE DISCOURSES. Scholars today
believe Machiavelli to be in the first line of liberal democratic theorists.
8. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERiCAN REPUBLIC
1776-87 (1969). Wood's seminal work supports the thesis that the colonialists
were experiencing a "Lockean Moment" during the Revolution and
Constitution drafting years whereby the dominant political influence was
Lockean liberal individualism. This is in opposition to Pocock's Machiavellian
Moment whereby the American colonialist's political philosophy was dictated
by their concern in nurturing civic republicanism. See also Isaac Kramnick,
Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 629 (1982). Kramnick
posits: "For over a hundred years, the world of scholarship agreed that Locke
was the patron saint of Anglo-American ideology in the eighteenth century and
that liberalism with its stress on individuality and private rights was the
dominant ideal in that enlightened revolutionary era." Id.
9. John Locke (1632-1704) was born into a well-to-do family in England.
Locke entered political life beginning with his association with the Earl of
Shaftesbury. This relationship eventually embroiled him into a confrontation
with Charles II and precipitated Locke's self imposed exile to Holland in 1683.
Locke wrote the Second Treatise of Government prior to his exile, and upon
his return to England in 1689, used it as a defense to justify his personal
commitment to the Whig position during the Whig Revolution.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/12

2

Molander: Machiavellian Jurisprudence

1994]

MACHIAVELLAN JURISPRUDENCE

dialectical relationship with one another,"
which resulted in a paradigm

shift11

10

595

the synthesis of

in American political and

constitutional theory that merged the two principal traditions of
liberalism and republicanism. 12 The modem debate concerning
the theoretical underpinnings of the American political culture

during the Constitution's ratification process, has focused on how
liberal or republican the Constitution and its attendant Bill of

13
Rights was to be construed.

Although there has been academic disagreement as to the
underlying philosophical influence of American political and

constitutional thought, constitutional scholars agree that the Bill
of Rights was added to the Constitution because of AntiFederalist pressure. 14 Ironically, however, the First Amendment
10. Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual
Rights: The FirstAmendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24
(1990).
11. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCMNTWIC REVOLUTIONS 1011 (1962) (a paradigm is that underlying belief structure common to all
practitioners in a given discipline); see also THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 119
(Isaac Kramnick, ed. 1987). Alexander Hamilton's dialogue in THE
FEDERALIST No. 9 evidenced a paradigm shift in American political theory
which fused republican and liberal principles whereby Publius, spokesman for
the Federalist political theory, stated that:
[Tihe science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has
received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now
well
understood ..... [and]
these
are
wholly
new
discoveries.... [They are means, and powerful means, by which the
excellencies of republican government may be retained and its
imperfections lessened or avoided.
Id.
12. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1558 (arguing that colonial constitutional
theory fused pluralism [Lockean liberalism] with republicanism).
13. Jordan M. Steiker, Creating a Community of Liberals, 69 TEX. L.
REv. 795 (1991) (reviewing C. EDwIN BAKER, HUMAN LmERTY AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (Oxford University Press 1989)). Professor Steiker
argues that the question becomes whether the framers of the constitution
adopted a liberal republic where a "robust political community with basically
liberal values" appeared, or a republican liberal state where the "political
community is [first devoted] to individual autonomy and then to republican
dialogue... ."Id. at 811.
14. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTrTUTONAL
CONVENTIONAL DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) [hereinafter ANTi-
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found its expression in Lockean liberal discourse. 15 Yet, even
though First Amendment jurisprudence has been representative of
liberal constitutionalism, that jurisprudence has been applied to
The anti-federalist objections to the powers granted to
the federal government began to crystallize in specific proposals for
amendments that would limit those powers. The Massachusetts Convention
proposed a relatively short list of amendments, while Virginia, in June, 1788,
put forth a much larger list, in large measure duplicated by the North Carolina
and New York conventions later in the year. Id. at 217-26. A full elaboration
of anti-federalist thought was offered in a lengthy series of articles, usually
entitled Letters from the Federal Framers, circulated in pamphlet form in New
York City in which a letter distributed in October 9th 1787 stated:
[t]here are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming
the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed - a free
and enlightened people, in forming this compact, will not resign all their
rights to those who govern, and they will fix limits to their legislators
and rulers, which will soon be plainly seen by those who are governed,
as well as by those who govern; and the latter will know they cannot be
passed unperceived by the former, and without giving a general alarm [t]hese rights should be made the basis of every constitution ....
Id. at 266. After the Pennsylvania Convention ratified the Constitution on
December 12, 1787, by a vote of 46 to 23, twenty-one members of the
minority signed a dissenting address stating:
The first consideration that this review suggests, is the omission of a
Bill of Rights, ascertaining and fundamentally establishing those
inalienable and personal rights of men, without the full, free, and secure
enjoyment of which there can be no liberty, and over which it is not
necessary for a good government to have the control.
Id. at 247. DeWitt's Essays appearing in the Boston American Herald on
October 27, 1787 stated "[tlhat the want of a Bill of Rights to accompany this
proposed System, is a solid objection to it. . . ." Id. at 195. But see THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 476. In THE FEDERALIST No. 84,
Alexander Hamilton argued that the inclusion of a bill of rights was
unnecessary: "why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do?," essentially arguing that the proposed government was one of
limited powers.. Id.
FEDERALIST PAPERS].

15. C.

EDWIN BAKER,

HUMAN

LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH

(1989)

(freedom of speech representative of Lockean discourse); see also Zechariah
Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARv. L. REV. 932, 947 (1919).
But see LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION, vii-xii, at 176-309
(1960) (noting that the framers had no liberal conception of what the Bill of
Rights meant and therefore the liberal basis for First Amendment interpretation
is unsupported).
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achieve republican results at times. 16 The fears expressed by the
American colonialists about the possibility of the judicial
institution being the conduit through which the government could
17
encroach on individual liberty were a legitimate concern.
The purpose of this article is to explore the United States
Supreme Court's doctrinal approach in decisions concerning
freedom of speech. In particular, it will examine political speech
since 1919, and discuss whether the Court's holdings have been

16. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919). These post World War I cases, wherein Justice Holmes wrote in a
libertarian prose for the Court, arose in the context of political speech against
the war and opposition to the draft during World War I. In all three cases the
Court elevated community concerns over individual liberties presumably
protected under the free speech clause of the First Amendment.
17. See ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 14, at 293-309. The
"Brutus" Essays, sixteen in all, appeared in the New York Journal between
October, 1787 and April, 1788. This was at the same time Hamilton was
publishing THE FEDERALIST PAPERS in New York City. On February 7, 1788,
in Essay # 12, "Brutus" attacked the Federalist's second object to "establish
justice" by stating:
This must include not only the idea of... making laws which shall be
the measure or rule of right, but also of providing for the application of
this rule or of administering justice under it. And under this the courts
will... extend the power... to all cases they possibly ran... to wit,
pass laws and provide for the execution of them, for the general
distribution of justice between man and man.
Id. at 301. On March 20, 1788, "Brutus" repeats his warning: "[t]heir
decisions on the meaning of the constitution will commonly take place in cases
which arise between individuals,... [and] [t]hese cases will immediately
affect individuals only .... " Id. at 308. But see THE FEDERALIST PAPERS,
supra note 11. In THE FEDERALIST No. 78, Hamilton states a number of
propositions: first, that "the courts of justice are to be considered as the
bulwarks of a limited Constitution and against legislative encroachments;" id.
at 440; second, that the courts are "to guard... the rights of individuals from
the

effects

of those

ill

humors

which.., have

a tendency ...

to

occasion... serious oppressions of the minor party in the community," id;
and further posits that "the general liberty of the people can never be
endangered from that quarter," id. at 437, since it is the branch least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution.
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consistent with Machiavellian theory. 18 The period from 1919 to
the present has been characterized as a period of Supreme Court
jurisprudence whereby the Court has increasingly recognized and

developed a doctrinal approach consistent with Lockean liberal
individualism. 19 However, I hope to show that the Supreme

Court's doctrinal approach during this period has been anything
but consistent 20 with the American liberal political tradition. In
fact, the Court's decisions have consistently reflected Lockean
liberal individualism in politically pacific or concordant times,
reflecting the presence of a republican liberal state, 2 1 and

Machiavellian civic republicanism in politically discordant times,
demonstrating the presence of a liberal republic. 22 Further, such
a dichotomous

approach

is

consistent

with Machiavellian

principles of justice with respect to individual liberty, as set out
in Machiavelli's two seminal works -- The Prince2 3 and The
Discourses.2 4

18. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 1, at 1515-16 (1988). Professor
Michelman views constitutional interpretation as a Machiavellian practice of
return-to-the-founding-principles. Id.
19. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, A Theory of Free Speech, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1837, 1839 (1987). Professor Richards tracks the liberalization of the
free speech clause from the standpoint of Lockean principles of toleration. Id.
20. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 299, 299 (1978). BeVier noted that the Supreme Court's doctrinal
approach has not "embraced a unifying theory of the free speech
clause ... nor [has it] reached a consensus on appropriate premises for first
amendment cases. .... " Id.

21. See infra part I (political community is first devoted to personal
autonomy and then to the collective good).
22. See infra part II (a political community with basically liberal values).
23. See infra note 70.
24. See infra note 34. Basically, the thesis advanced in this article is
central to Machiavelli's theory as expressed in his two major works - THE
PRINCE and THE DIscouRsEs - in which he describes an overall political
evolution of the state. Once the state is threatened, the Prince is justified in
using coercive means to achieve the security of the state. However, it is the
natural, sociopolitical evolution of the state that more liberal or less tyrannical
republics will follow once the state has been secured.
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Part I of this article will be devoted to the principal premise
that colonial Americans of the Revolutionary period experienced
a moment in American history where they fused Machiavellian
republicanism with Lockean liberalism - the founding moment.
A subsidiary premise will focus on the two original constitutional
principles that were embodied within the Bill of Rights during the
founding moment as a result of the liberal-republican synthesis.
First, I will discuss a system of deliberative politics, and second,
an analysis of the Framers' commitment to a strong and energetic
government with the necessary and requisite powers to promote
nationhood and national unity.
Part II will examine three areas. First, it will examine
Machiavelli's and the Supreme Court's analogous approach in
balancing republicanism and individual liberalism. Second, it will
review the principal case law from 1919 to the present
concerning Supreme Court decisions that have addressed political
speech. 25 Third, I will try to tie together the first and second
issues in an effort to reveal the Court's consistency with
Machiavellian theory of justice. Finally, I have several
concluding remarks.
I. THE FOUNDING MOMENT: THE LIBERAL

REPUBLICAN SYNTHESIS
Historians

republicanism

and constitutional scholars have

throughout

the

sociopolitical

traced civic

economic

25. See Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of
Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 263 (1986). Gibson
noted that Justice Holmes wrote as many as seven opinions on the subject of
free speech, whereas most justices, from 1791 to 1917, wrote only three or
four opinions on that subject during their entire tenures on the bench. Id.; see
also Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 975 (1968). The author noted that "it was not until the end of World War
I that there had been any major decisions by the Supreme Court applying the
guarantees of the First Amendment .... " Id. at 975. This is the primary
reason the analysis in this article is limited to the period from 1919 to the
present.
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development of the United States. 26 The creators and supporters
of the Constitution argued strenuously that the Constitution was a
fulfillment and not a repudiation of civic republicanism.
Theoretically the Constitution provided for a thoroughly
republican form of government, which embodied Lockean liberal
individualism. 27 This has led a number of scholars, specifically,

Pocock, to postulate that the "Founding Fathers occupied a
'Machiavellian moment' -- a crisis between personality and
society, virtue and corruption -... and the ambiguity of the
republic's position, [at this time, could be more] ... appreciated
[through a civic republican perspective] than it could have been
28
from a Lockean perspective."
The great debate of 1787-88, between the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists, was resolved by the Founding Fathers balancing
the liberal concept of the autonomous individual with the
republican concept of the community or preservation of the

26. MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 6, at 522-45 (classical
influence and awareness of the "Machiavellian Moment" continues to the
present day); see also RALPH KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE
FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 1789-1829 (University of North Carolina Press
1984) (classical politics ended with the rise of Jacksonian democracy); DANIEL
W. HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 301-05 (1979)
(republican or Whig principles lasted until after the Civil War).
27. See Frank Goodman, Mark Tushnet on Liberal Constitutional Theory:
Mission Impossible, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2259 (1988) (reviewing TUSHNET,
supra note 1) (arguing that the Federalists and Anti-Federalists shared many
theoretical concepts to government including general theories about citizenship
-"civic virtue"- and assumptions about human nature). But see Wood, supra
note 8, at 606 (stating that 1787 and the adoption of the Constitution signaled
"the end of classical politics"); Kramnick, supra note 8, at 664 (the American
experience during the 1770's and 1780's represented part of the ongoing
paradigm shift initiated by Enlightenment theorists specifically John Locke);
Hartz, supra note 2 (Hartz's thesis holds that the founding fathers
wholeheartedly endorsed the paradigm of the enlightenment rejecting classical
notions of virtue and polls).
28. See J.G.A. Pocock, The Americanization of Virtue: Corruption,
Constitution and Frontier,in MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 6, at 545.
For a discussion of the "crisis between personality and society, virtue and
corruption.. . ." see J.G.A. Pocock, The Eighteenth-Century Debate: Virtue,
Passionand Commerce, in MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 6, at 462.
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union. 2 9 The difficulties of that task were inextricably related to
the inherent conflict between the Machiavellian principles of
justice - virtue and corruption 30 - that political philosophers of
that era addressed. 3 1 It was the Founding Fathers' design to
create a government that would be capable of filtering partial and
impulsive individual desires (corrupt action) through the

government's structural design. This would achieve a deliberate
and virtuous result - the common good - while at the same time
29. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 482. In THE FEDERALIST

No. 85, Hamilton notes that "additional securities to republican government,
to liberty,... consist chiefly in the restraints which the Preservation of the
Union [sic] will impose on the local factions... and on the ambitions of
powerful

individuals ... who

might... become

the

despots

of

the

people .... " Id. Earlier, in THE FEDERALIST No. 59, Hamilton states that he
is "greatly mistaken, not withstanding, if there be any article in the whole plan
more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of
this plain proposition, that every government ought to contain in itself the
means of its own preservation."Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
30. See Quentin Skinner, The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty, in
MACHIAVELLI AND REPUBLICANISM 293 (Gisella Bock et al. eds., 1990).
According to Skinner, for Machiavelli to be "corrupt [is] a term of art to
denote our natural tendency to ignore the claims of our community as soon as
they seem to conflict with the pursuit of our own immediate advantage, thus to
be virtuous would be to forego personal interests for the common good." Id. at
304. In short, virtue is the quality of mind and action that creates, saves or
maintains the state's interests. Id.
31. Many of the Founding Fathers were well versed in Machiavellian
political theory. For example, Thomas Jefferson's library contained an
extensive collection of works by both Aristotle and Machiavelli, the two
seminal thinkers of the classical republican tradition. See THOMAS
JEFFERSON'S LmRARY

80 (James Gilreath & Douglas L. Wilson eds., 1989).

The point being introduced here is that, although it was James Madison who
was the principal theoretical architect and draftsman of the Bill of Rights, he
nonetheless presented the twelve original amendments to Thomas Jefferson for
his commentary and recommendations. Thus there is inferential support for the
notion that it is quite possible that a "Machiavellian Moment" was occurring
during the theoretical development and construction of the Bill of Rights. See 3
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: AN ILLUSTRATED
SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 593-623 (1971). The author noted that

"the correspondence between Jefferson and Madison was important for two
reasons: [the first principal reason was that] each influenced the other's
thinking, particularly... the evolution of Madison's thinking on the Bill of
Rights ... ."Id.
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protect individual liberty. 32 Similarly, Machiavelli espoused the
traditional belief in the importance of the common good. Under
Machiavellian theory, however, the government plays a more
central role in promoting what it believes to be virtuous values,
that is, community values ensuring the common good or the
preservation of the state's interests. 33 In fact, Machiavelli argues,
in the beginning of Book I of The Discourses, that the most
important method to induce people to acquire virtue is by using
the coercive powers of the law in such a way as to force them to
34
place the good of their community above all selfish interests.
32. See, e.g.,

MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALISTS,

AND

205 (1987); see also THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note
11. James Madison stated that every action of man must first have a motive
and an opportunity for it to occur. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
He sought to extend the republic over a vast and populated area in order to
divide or separate the factious motive from its opportunity to act on that
motive. Id. at 122-28. Thus, this diminished the probability that they would
have the opportunity to command a majority. The effect was to inhibit actions
under the influence of partial and immediate interests that might act against the
public good. Id. In THE FEDERALIST No. 51, Madison noted that federalism
would also act as an institutional device to protect individual liberty by
constructing tiers of protection between the people and government. Id. at 31921.
33. See NiCCOLO MACHIAVELLI: THE DIScOURSES 112 (Bernard Crick et
al. eds., Penguin Classics 1983) (1970). In Book I, chapter 3, Machiavelli
THE CONSTITUTION

stated "that men never do good unless necessity drives them to it ....

[and]

when they are free to choose and can do just as they please, confusion and
disorder become everywhere rampant. Hence it is said that.., laws will make
them good." Id. To Machiavelli, the ultimate common good was the
preservation of the state itself. Id. at 100-38.
34. See supra note 33, at 124. In Book I, Chapter 3, Machiavelli states:
No authority more useful or necessary can be granted to those appointed
to look after the liberties of the state than that of being able to indict
before ...

some... court such citizens as have committed an offense

prejudicial to the freedom of the state. Such an institution has two
consequences most useful in a republic. First, for fear of being
prosecuted, its citizens attempt nothing prejudicial to the state, and, if
they do attempt anything, are suppressed forthwith without respect to
persons. Secondly, an outlet is provided [that allows] recourse [when]
abnormal methods likely to bring disaster on the republic as a whole
[are used by persons].
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Furthermore, in Book Ill, chapter 1 of The Discourses,
Machiavelli emphasizes that republics advance to glory "either by
the virtue of some individual or by the virtue of an institution. "35
Therefore, according to Machiavelli, corruption is any
civil/political discord that threatens the republic's general welfare
in light of its founding principles. 3 6 It is at this juncture that the
state must cleanse itself by returning to its original principles for
the good of the community. 37 As Machiavelli so aptly points out:
The reason is easy to understand; for it is not the well-being of
individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the
community; and it is beyond question that it is only in republics
that the common good is looked to properly in that all that
promotes it is carried out; and, however much this or that private
person may be the loser on this account, there are so many who
benefit thereby that the common good can be realized in spite of
38
those few who suffer in consequence.
Thus, classic civic republicanism advances the notion that
individual liberties can be abrogated when the community's
39
founding principles are threatened.
A problematic question arises as to what were the founding
principles that gave birth to the Constitution? It is the position of
this article that the original principles were defined by the

35. Id. at 387. Machiavelli asserts that the power of the courts is an
institutional device to force individuals to be virtuous, that is, to subordinate
their personal interests for the good of the community or to preserve the state.
Id. at 124.
36. Id. at 385-90.
37. Machiavelli, in Book m, Chapter 1, states:
[M]en are emboldened to try something fresh and to talk sedition.
Hence provision has of necessity to be made against this by restoring
that government to what it was at its origin. Such a return to their
original principles in republics is [accomplished by virtuous individuals
as well as by virtuous laws and institutions].
Id. at 388.
Chapter 2, expresses the central
38. Id. at 275. Machiavelli, in Book II,
individual freedom must be
civic
republicanism
of
principle
guiding
Id. at 274-81.
community.
of
the
the
good
subordinate to achieving
39. See supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text.
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synthesis of liberal and republican maxims. 40 The existence of
the liberal-republican synthesis, that of Lockean liberal
individualism fused with Machiavellian civic republicanism is
evidenced by many references in the Federalist Papers. The
Federalist Papers are generally accepted as the authoritative
discourse on American political and constitutional theory during
41
the Constitution framing period.

The Federalist Papers systematically outline the theoretical and
political assumptions that undergird the Constitution, which was
once thought to be premised on Lockean liberalism. Upon
review, however, this Lockean premise seems to be more the
result of historical distortion than of American reality. For
example, the Constitution is more of a balance between the two
opposing traditional theories. 42 In essence, the Federalists did not
win, but rather, constructed their "new science of politics" 43
from both classical traditions. 44
Both the liberal and republican traditions advanced the general
concept that institutions had to be arranged so as to moderate the
40. This article recognizes two original First Amendment principles
concerning the issue of liberty. First, a system of deliberative politics woven
into the philosophical fabric of the Constitution; and second, a strong desire by
the framers to provide for a strong and energetic government with the
necessary and requisite powers to go about the business of governing - a
process that in itself secures liberty. The latter principle advocates that the
former principle only protects speech that participates in the process of
deliberation. However, it does not protect speech that drastically impedes that
process, because impeding the very process that the state relies on to promote
collective responsibility would directly affect the stability of the state itself.
41. See generally GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALISTS (University of
Illinois Press 1989).
42. See Goodman, supra note 27, at 2304. Professor Goodman argues that
classical liberals did not have a monopoly on their political assumptions, and
that many, if not all, of these assumptions were shared by both classical
republicans and classical liberals, i.e., Anti-Federalist and Federalists. Id.
43. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 119 (THE FEDERALIST No.
9, Alexander Hamilton).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 243 (James Madison). In addition,
Madison states that "[a]mong the difficulties encountered by the
[constitutional] convention, a very important one must have lain in combining
the requisite stability and energy in government with the inviolable attention
due to liberty and to the republican form." Id.
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conflict between self-interest and public interest, if the latter
motive had any chance of survival. The Founding Fathers
believed that it was their task to make sure that whatever form of
government was instituted, it would promote virtuous results.
This was founded on the belief that the people would be led "by
a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions
and partial interests to the public good. "45
The principle of deliberative politics was essential to the
founders' design. In fact, the Founding Fathers made an honest
attempt to institute a government so that the governing process
would reflect a "cool and deliberate sense of the community."46
This Federalist observation supports the liberal-republican thesis
in that both liberal and republican traditions attached a similar
value to virtue by recognizing the importance it plays in
achieving the public good or even preserving the state itself.4 7
The importance of the balance between the deliberative politics
principle and the preservation of the state principle is further

evidenced by the Federalists contending that "[t]he republican
45. Id. at 247.
46. 1d. at 371. In THE FEDERALIST No. 63, Madison asserts a further
protection afforded by the deliberative politics principle when associated with
the Senate whereby he states:
I shall not scruple to add that such an institution may be sometimes
necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors
and delusions .... In these critical moments, how salutary will be the
interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in
order to check the misguided career and to suspend the blow mediated
by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can
regain their authority over the public mind?
Id. at 370-71.
47. See Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli's Discorsi and tie Pre-humanist
Origins of Republican Ideas, in MACHIAVELLI AND REPUBLICANISM, supra
note 30, at 121. Professor Skinner's position is that Machiavelli endorsed the
traditional belief in the common good. Additionally, unless all citizens' actions
are not governed by virtue, in a sense placing the good of the community
above their own private interests, civic greatness cannot be achieved. Id. at
138. Machiavelli repeats this theme throughout THE DISCOURSES. Crucial
passages referring to acts reflecting this republican principle can be found in
Book I, chapter 9; Book II, chapter 2; Book H, chapters 23, 30, & 47. See
THE DISCOURSES, supra note 33.
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principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community
should govern ...

[and] ...

it does not require an unqualified

complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every
transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of
men .... "48 Therefore, the Framers felt a need for a governing
system consisting of deliberative reflection that would be imposed
on the people in order to induce them to act in a collective and
civically responsible manner. The Federalists based their
republican assertions on the observation that "the mild voice of
reason... is but too often drowned.., by the clamors of an
impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain." 4 9 The
Federalists further reasoned that "[it is a just observation that the
people commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD.... [but they do
not] always reason right about the means of promoting it.'50
Subsequently, a central remedy of the Framers' scheme of
government was to install, within the machinery of the
government, the processes of due deliberation and reflection in
determining enlightened policy outcomes, so that reasoned
consideration of social consequences would be extended over
space and time. 5 1 Publius 52 concluded that the solution to this
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 409-10 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac
Kramnick ed. 1987). In TiE FEDERALIST No. 71, Hamilton notes the
importance of the deliberative politics principle working its magic, stating:
When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people
are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom
they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests to withstand
the temporary delusion in order to give them time and opportunity for
more cool and sedate reflection.
Id. at 410.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 276 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick
ed., 1987).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 410 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac
Kramnick ed., 1987).
51. See VINCENT OSTROM, THE POLmCAL THEORY OF A COMPOUND
REPUBLIC 43 (2d ed. 1987).
52. See, e.g., Martin Diamond, The Federalists, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL

PimosoPHY 573 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 1963). Professor
Diamond states:
Publius, the educated reader knew, was the Publius Valerius Publicola,
described in Plutarch. Publius like Caesar was a "Strong Man," but
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circumstance was that "[i]n framing a government... you must
first enable the government

to control the governed[,]'

53

reasoning that the deliberative politics model requires that "[t]he
passions [of the public] ought to be controlled and regulated by
the government." 5 4 Again, for the Federalists to assert that self-

interest should be channeled to promote a collective interest
underlines the importance the Framers placed on restraining

"deliberative politics" in order to preserve the very system that
provides the "deliberative politics model" stability.

Not surprisingly, republican theorists such as Machiavelli also
argued that the government should take a focal role in regulating
and controlling individual passions, and thereby creating a

virtuous body politic, which would further assure that all would
act in furtherance of the public good. 55 Just as Machiavelli had
asserted nearly three hundred years earlier, the Federalists in true

republican dialogue, believed that virtue was the building block
of good government. Although Publius noted that:

between them there was an enormous difference: Caesar destroyed a
republic, Publius saved one. Unlike Caesar, Publius makes his
contribution to the Republic in a way compatible with its continued
existence. He brings to its salvation qualities it cannot itself supply, but
leaves it essentially intact after his efforts ...the character of
Publius... was exactly appropriate to the situation ....Publius, with
a capacity and knowledge that people cannot themselves supply, brings
to the people the Constitution (sic) that will preserve, indeed will safely
found the Republic.
Id. at 575.
53. THE FEDERALIsT PAPERS, supra note 11, at 320 (THE FEDERALIST No.
51, James Madison).
54. Id. at 315 (THE FEDERALIST No. 49, James Madison) (Issac
Kramnick, ed. 1987); see also THE DISCOURSES, supra note 33, at 112.
Machiavelli observes that "men never do good unless necessity drives them to
it; but when they are free to choose and can do just as they please, confusion
and disorder become everywhere rampant." Id.
55. See Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli, in GREAT POLmCAL THIKERS 5686 (Keith Thomas ed., 1992) (1981). Professor Skinner noted that Machiavelli
believed the most important and effective means of inducing people to acquire
virtue is by using the coercive powers of the law in such a way as to force
them to place the good of the community above self-interest. Id.
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there is a degree of depravity in mankind which require a certain
degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities
in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and
confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of
56
these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.

In essence, the strength of a republic was, for Publius, public
virtue. 5 7 But, since the Federalists believed that reason was the

slave to passion5 8 the process of deliberative politics was
important in slowing down the probability of impulsive acts from

occurring, which were inevitably "adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the

56. THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987)
at 339; see also ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 14, at 231 ("Centinel,"
Number I, October 5, 1787) (observing in the first of eighteen "Centinel"
articles printed in the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer and the Philadelphia
Freeman's Journal between October 5, 1787 and April 9, 1788 "Centinel" "[a]
republican or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are
virtuousl[").
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 122-28 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick
ed., 1987). The Madisonian theory postulates that "impure virtue" is distilled
by refining the voice of the people in a scheme of indirect elections. Id.; see
also GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALISTS

223-26 (1981)

The author stated that the electoral process purifies the popular vote, since bias
and private interest is purged and the distilled product is disinterest,
impartiality, candor, clarity, and virtue. Id.
58. See FREDERICK G. WHELAN, ORDER AND ARTIFICE IN HuME'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 138 (1985); see also WHITE, supra note 33, at 217
(1987). Professor White posits that it is the application of Publius' theory of
knowledge that dictates his belief that "[a]n ordinary man might be stupid or
he might be prevented by passion, selfish interest, or prejudice from seeing
what would bring long term happiness to the community.. . ." Id. In THE
FEDERALIST No. 31, Hamilton asserts that:
[in disquisitions] of every kind there are certain primary truths, or first
principles, upon which all subsequent reasoning must depend. These
contain an internal evidence which .... commands the assent of the
mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from
some disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of
some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice.
THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 216 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
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community." 5 9 Hence, a degree of constraint was necessary to
60
secure the public good.
The "deliberative politics model" would not only require

external constraints, but also internal constraints as well. These
constraints would come into play by implementing certain
institutional mechanisms also called "auxiliary precautions,"

61

but even this, to some extent, was not new to classic republican
theory. 62 Moreover, even pre-political rights, traditionally
59. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 123.
60. See id. at 482 (THE FEDERALIST No. 85). In THE FEDERALIST No. 15,
Hamilton asserts that "the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of
reason and justice without constraint." Id. at 149. Therefore, to Publius, the
political process is one that should enable human reason to be transformed
from a consideration of momentary passion into a more general and long term
consideration of policy, utility, and justice. See OSTROM, supra note 51.
61. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 318-22. Madison, in THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, introduces the concept of separation of powers and

checks and balances as a "means of keeping each [department] in their proper
places." Id. Madison also introduces the concept of a compound republic
whereby:
the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments. Hence, a double security arises to the
rights of the people, [namely], [t]he different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Id. at 321; see also George Carey, Separation of Powers Revisited and the
Madisonian Model: A Reply to the Critics, 72 AM. POL. SCIENcE REV. 151,
154 (Mar-June 1978) ("[The chief end sought through separation was the
avoidance of capricious and arbitrary government .... ").
62. THE DISCOURSES, supra note 33, at 109. Machiavelli, in the early 16th
century, alluded to a system of checks and balances and separation of powers
when he proposed that a mixed constitution is the best form in constructing a
government. Id. He stated that in creating a government you should: "choose
instead one that shared in them all, since.., such government would be
stronger and more stable, for if in one and the same state there was
principality, aristocracy and democracy each would keep watch over the
other." Id. Thus, in combination, they would withstand degenerating into
corruption by checking one another's excesses, preserving and complementing
one another's virtues, while imparting the necessary stability of good
government. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 309. In
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, Madison states that "power is of an encroaching
nature and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits
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associated with classical liberalism, were not as sacrosanct as
once believed. 63 It can be stated that our governmental
institutions were, and still are, a creature of our liberalrepublican political culture and have been imbued and continue to
be imbued with the guiding principles of liberalism and

republicanism.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the synthesis of liberal and
republican principles have underlined the United States Supreme
Court's doctrinal approach in reference to political speech. In
Anti-Federalist republican discourse, the "power in the judicial,
will enable [the Court] to mold the government, [which is
presumably the people,] into almost any shape they please. "64
Moreover, if virtue were to play an important role in achieving
the common good, and "[tihe passions ought to be controlled and
regulated by the government," 65 then an institution would be
required to ensure that the body politic would remain virtuous to
the republic's founding principles.66 Machiavellian republican
assigned to it. . .[and] the next and most difficult task is to provide some
practical security for each, against the invasion of the others."
63. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 90. In THE FEDERALIST
No. 2, John Jay asserts that "[n]othing is more certain than the indispensable
necessity of government; and it is equally undeniable that whenever and
however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights,
in order to vest it with requisite powers."; see also ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS,
supra note 14, at 195 (even the Anti-Federalists agreed that "[a] people,
entering into society, surrender such a part of their natural rights, as shall be
necessary for the existence of that society I").
64. ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 14, at 298.
65. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 315; see also THE
DIscouRsEs, supra note 33, at 238. Machiavelli stressed the role of virtuous
institutions by stating:, "[flirst of all, the populace, misled by the false
appearance of good, often seeks its own ruin, and, unless it be brought to
realize what is bad and what is good for it by someone in whom it has
confidence, brings on republics endless dangers and disasters." Id.
66. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 436-42. In THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, Hamilton states that the members of the Court "may be
an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
society." Id. at 441. In the same essay, he notes that the judges "ought to
regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are
not fundamental." Id. at 439. In THE FEDERALIST No. 81, Hamilton assures
the American people that the national courts are not to stray from the original
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theory held that a virtuous prince or an institution (presumably
with prince-like powers) would be necessary to ensure that the
citizens remain loyal 67 to the original principles of the
republic. 68 The main theoretical premise of this article is that the

Supreme Court has become an important institution that has
consistently demonstrated that it is capable of forcing Americans
to remain virtuous to our liberal-republican principles. In
essence, the Court has functioned as a modem "prince" or an
institution with prince-like powers.
In view of the above, an instructive review of Machiavelli's
theory of justice is essential in understanding the Supreme
Court's doctrinal approach to political speech. The Prince was

written to provide a prince or prince-like institution, a practical
methodology, 69 to help guide the state against any perceived
threat, 70 generally occurring in politically tumultuous times.

principles of the republic: "there is not a syllable in the plan under
consideration which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws
Id.
I..."at 451 (emphasis in
according to the spirit of the Constitution .

original).
67. See THE DISCOURSES, supra note 33, at 139-52. Machiavelli devotes a
whole section in THE DISCOURSES on how "love of country" (patriotism)
becomes a form of secular religion that bonds the people together in order to
ensure that they remain virtuous to the state's interests, thus acting with due
regard for the preservation of the state itself. Id.
68. Id. at 224. Machiavelli states that "[a] republic, therefore, ought to
have some institution whereby to prevent its citizens from doing wrong under
pretense of doing right, and to see their popularity is helpful, and not harmful
to liberty .... " Id. at 224-25. Similar to the Federalist political theory,
Machiavelli thought that factious activity was to be controlled in order to
guarantee the common good, which was ultimately the preservation of the
state. Id. at 481-82.
69. THE PRINCE 61 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. trans., University of
Chicago Press 1985). In Chapter XV, Machiavelli informs the reader that his
"intent is to write something useful to whoever understands it... for it is so
far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is
done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation." Id.
Accordingly, scholars today hold Machiavelli to be a forerunner of modem
political science, because he was the first political theorist to be concerned
with what "is" rather than what "ought" to be. Id.
70. Id. at 62. Machiavelli further concludes that:
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Once the republic is secured, however, changing circumstances
would require the prince to modify his methods. 7 1 In short, as
political discord abates and normality resumes, the prince-like
institution, in order to continue its success, must reform its
methods to conform with the changing circumstances. 72 To
Machiavelli, this change is mandated by the necessity of a prince
acting in accordance with his fortune. 73 In reference to
Machiavelli's principles of justice, when a prince-like institution
is confronted with politically threatening circumstances it can
employ repressive tactics because such means are justified under

one should not care about incurring the reputation of those vices without
which it is difficult to save one's state; for if one considers everything
well, one will find something appears to be virtue, which if pursued
would be one's ruin, and something else appears to be vice, which if
pursued results in one's security and well-being.
Id.
71. Id. at 99. In chapter XXV, Machiavelli first states the following
proposition:
I believe, further, that he is prosperous who adapts his mode of
proceeding to the qualities of the times; and similarly, he is
unprosperous whose procedure is in disaccord with the times. For one
sees that in the things that lead men to... glories and riches ....[t]his
arises from nothing other than from the quality of the times that they
conform to or not in their procedure.
Id. See also THE DIscouRsEs, supra note 33, at 430. Machiavelli echoes THE
PRINCE stating that "I have often thought that the reason why men are
sometimes unfortunate, sometimes fortunate, depends upon whether their
behavior is in conformity with the times [or circumstances]." Id.
72. THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 61. Machiavelli insightfully states that:
[tor a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards must
come to ruin among so many who are not good. Hence it is necessary to
a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to be
good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity."
Id.; see also THE DIsCOURsES, supra note 33, at 432 ("The downfall of

[republics] also comes about because institutions in republics do not change
with the times . .

").

73. THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 101. Machiavelli concludes Chapter
XXV by reiterating that "when fortune varies and men remain obstinate in
their modes, men are prosperous while they are in accord, and as they come
into discord, unprosperous." Id.
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the circumstances in effectuating the laudable end of maintaining
the security of the republic. 74
On the other hand, The Discourses temper the harshness of
Machiavelli's theory of justice found in The Prince. In a number
of chapters in The Discourses, Machiavelli observes that in less
tumultuous times the repressive means utilized to secure the state
will, with the passage of time, become unnecessary or "out of
sync" with present conditions; and therefore, these means should
be relaxed or even done away with. 75 Thus, once the state is
secured Machiavelli supports principles of tolerance and respect

for individual liberties, 76 and even suggests that more reliance
74. Id. at 65. In Chapter XVII, Machiavelli introduces another
proposition:
[a] prince, therefore, so as to keep his subjects united and unfaithful,
should not care about the infamy of his cruelty, because with the very
few examples he will be more merciful than those who for the sake of
too much mercy allow disorders to continue, from which come killings
or robberies; for these customarily harm a whole community, but the
executions that come from the prince harm one particular person.
Id. at 65-66; see also Tim DiscouRsEs, supra note 33, at 163 ("[W]hen
corruption [has] set in .... normal methods will not suffice now that normal
methods are bad. Hence it is necessary to resort to extraordinary methods,
such as the use of force ... so that one can dispose [of corruption] as one
thinks fit.").
75. Id. at 428.
There are two things here which should be borne in mind. One is that,
in order to obtain glory, a man must use different methods in a
[republic] that is corrupt from what he would use in one in which
political life is still vigorous. The other, which is almost the same as the
first, is that in the way they behave, and especially where deeds of
moment are concerned, men should take account of the times, and act
accordingly.
Id.
76. Id. at 162. Machiavelli continues with this theme by stating: "[a]nyone
anxious to serve the public should be able to propose his plan. It is also a good
thing that everyone should be at liberty to express his opinion on it, so that
when the people have heard what each has to say they may choose the best
plan." Id. Interestingly, this republican dialogue is strikingly similar to the
liberal dialogue used by Justice Holmes where he formulated his "marketplace
of ideas" justification for expanding individual liberties concerning free
speech. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Holmes stated that "the best test of the
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can be placed on the people. 77 Although in normal times the
prince-like institution will eventually be restricted by laws, the
people must always be bound to the original principles of the
republic. 78 Machiavelli concludes The Discourses by observing
that, in reality, the preservation of the republic is of utmost
importance, for without it, there can be no laws and consequently
no liberty. 79 Hence, Machiavelli reserves to the republic the right

truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which [one's] wishes safely can
be carried out." Id.
77. Id. at 116. Machiavelli argues as to whether the haves (the rich and
influential) or the have-nots (the common people) should be entrusted to
protect liberty once the state is secured. "[I]t will be seen that in the former
there is a great desire to dominate and in the latter merely the desire not to be
dominated." Id.; see also THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 39. Machiavelli
expressed this theme in chapter IX:
He who arrives in the principality with popular support finds himself
alone there, and around him has either no one or very few who are not
ready to obey. Besides this, one cannot satisfy the great with decency
and without injury to others, but one can satisfy the people; for the end
of the people is more decent than that of the great, since the great want
to oppress and the people want not to be oppressed.
Id.
78. THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 69 ("Thus, you must know that there
are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other with force ...[b]ut because
the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to the second.").
79. THE DIscouRsEs, supra note 33, at 515. In Book III, chapter 41,
Machiavelli observes that the good of the community above all private interests
and ordinary considerations or morality is held to be no less essential in the
case of the rank-and-file citizens. Machiavelli states: "it is good to defend
one's country in whatever way it be done, whether it entail ignominy or glory;
for ...

if it were not saved ...its freedom would be lost." Id. at 514-15.

Machiavelli further adds that:
[W]hen the safety of one's country wholly depends on the decision to be
taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to
kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious. On the
contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that alternative
should be wholeheartedly adopted which will save the life and preserve
the freedom of one's country.
Id. at 515.
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to use force when its security is apparently threatened, whether
the threat's origin is internal or external. 80

It is within this context that the Supreme Court has paralleled
Machiavelli's theory of justice. In retrospect, the Supreme Court
has acted with a certain practical flexibility that illustrates the
Court's adherence to Machiavelli's methodology as developed in
The Prince and The Discourses.81 Part II of this article will
examine a number of Supreme Court cases that came before the
Court during politically concordant and discordant times from
1919 to the flag burning case decided in 1989.82 The Court has
followed a liberal-republican approach in deciding all of these
cases. In essence, the Court has constrained individual liberty
during politically stressful periods in America's history, but has
relaxed this constraint during politically peaceful periods or
where the perception of an internal or external threat was
3
minimal.8

II. THE SUPREME COURT, POLITICAL SPEECH AND
MACHIAVELLI'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
After having devoted almost all of his effort in The Discourses,
expounding his theory of justice by developing and explaining the
principles of virtue, fortune, and necessity and the effect of these
80. THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 72. Machiavelli states that "a prince
should have two fears: one within, on account of his subjects; the other
outside, on account of external powers." Id.
81. See infra part II.
82. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 573 (1989).
83. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REviEw 107-08 (1980). Professor Ely noted that during World War I
and during the Communist Scare of the late 1940's and early 1950s, the Court
took a narrow view of constitutional protection of speech. By contrast, in the
1920s, and beginning again in the late 1950s, after the Communist Scare had
abated, the Court moved towards greater protection of speech. Therefore, the
historical periods that will be reviewed begin with the first "red scare" after
World War I, the second "red scare" of the McCarthy Era which coincided
with the Korean War and the effort to contain communism during the Vietnam
War, and then contrasting these politically tumultuous periods with the years
falling in between and up to the present. Id.
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concepts on the ends/means maxim, Machiavelli concludes by
noting that force must at times be used when the laws become
ineffective in guiding individuals to be virtuous. Machiavelli
stresses that private ambitions must be compatible with the
common good, which to him ultimately meant the preservation of
the state. The Discourses revisit the harshness of Machiavelli's
theory of justice in The Prince. Machiavelli's return to the basic
formulations of justice espoused in The Prince evidence his
republican concern for the preservation of the state. In contrast,
his liberal dialogue in The Discourses addresses the importance
of individual liberties. Machiavelli rationalizes this apparent
inconsistency by observing that employing flexible methods in
saving the state is a virtue in itself. This leads him to posit that
changing circumstances not only require but justify different
modes of action. 84 Therefore, to be flexible is to be virtuous,
even if one is acting in his own self interests so long as his
behavior is to serve (preserve) the community. 85 Not only is
flexibility virtuous, it is also consistent with Machiavelli's theory
of justice.
This same flexibility is apparent when viewing the pattern by
which the Supreme Court has treated the balance between
promoting the "system of deliberative politics" and the Court's
concern for our second original constitutional principle - the
preservation of the state itself. The Court has adopted two
approaches that are dictated by the circumstances at hand. In one
instance, the Court will advance liberal constitutionalism
(deliberative politics), and in the other instance it will advance
republican constitutionalism (preservation of the state). The

84. See THE DIscouRsEs supra note 33, at 425-32.; see also THE PRINCE,
supra note 69, at 98-101.
85. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11 (in THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 1, 22, 57, & 73, both Hamilton and Madison posit that even
selfish interests could be made to serve the public good); see also supra note

47 and accompanying text (in a number of passages Machiavelli illustrates that
individuals acting in their own interests can also serve the public good).
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difference between the two is whether or not there is a perceived

threat to the state's ideological precepts. 86

Since 1919 the Court has generally interpreted the First
Amendment in liberal terms. 8 7 However, the Court gets derailed
at times from this liberal approach when the political system is
tested by the strain of crisis conditions. Beginning with the Draft

and Espionage Act cases of 1919, which were concerned about
the spread of Bolshevism, 8 8 the Court has had trouble balancing
the equities while developing the parameters of political speech

when our original constitutional principle's conflict with each
other. The trouble the Court encountered in adopting a truly

libertarian First Amendment doctrinal approach in Schenck v.

United States,8 9 Frohwerk v. United States,9 0 Debs v. United

86. See Robert M. Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amendment:
1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REv. 349 (1981). Professor Cover notes that "since its
decision in Marbury v. Madison in 1803 [the Supreme Court] has been the
political philosopher or, if one prefers a more pejorative connotation, the
ideologue of American democracy." Id.
87. See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Fxpression in Wartime, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 975, 975-76 (1968) (reviewing First Amendment jurisprudence
from 1919 to 1968 noting that the Court has followed a liberal track of
interpretation).
88. STEVEN H. SHFFRIN & JESSE H. COOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
CASES-COMMENTs-Q E ONs 19 (1991) (the Espionage Act and state sedition
laws were enacted in response to World War I and the fear of Bolshevism that
developed in its wake); see also Gabriel Kolko, The Decline of American
Radicalism in the Twentieth Century, in FOR A NEv AMERICA 197-220 (James
Weinstein et al. ed., 1970) (noting that government repression contributed
greatly to suppressing the influence of radical politics in the early 20th
century); see also ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, POLITcAL REPRESSION IN MODERN
AMERICA 1870 To THE PRESENT 121 (1978). Professor Goldstein noted that

during World War I, the federal government and the conservative American
Federation of Labor joined together an alliance to crush radical labor groups
that drew their support from the Socialist Party. Id. By the end of World War
I, the International Workers of the World, members of the left-wing of
American socialist politics, had been effectively destroyed; the momentum of
the New Partisan League, a Midwest group that was challenging the grain,
banking and railroad interests, had been stopped; and, the Socialist Party itself
had been seriously damaged. Id.
89. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Although the defendant did not explicitly advocate
illegal resistance to the draft, but rather merely advocated peaceful measures,
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States,9 1 and Abrams v. United States9 2 was brought on by the
inherent
conflict
between
liberal
versus
republican
constitutionalism. Although the test used by the Court in all four

cases is generally viewed
as grounded in liberal
constitutionalism, even libertarian grounded formulations could
not guarantee liberal results that would promote the free flow of
political information necessary for the deliberative politics model
to function within our various concepts of self-rule or liberal
93
democratic theory.
The liberal-republican synthesis of 1787-88 recognized that
"liberty - the ability of the people to do what they want - would
be both acknowledged as a right and restricted as a power, since
such as petitioning for the repeal of the Conscription Act, the Court held that
the defendants could be constitutionally convicted of conspiracy to violate the
1917 Espionage Act. Id. at 50-51.
90. 249 U.S. 204, 207-09 (1919) (upholding the Espionage Act convictions
of defendant writers of editorials criticizing the draft in a German language
paper).
91. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Pursuant to the Espionage Act, the Court upheld
the conviction of Eugene Debs, a prominent socialist and presidential candidate
who was convicted for criticizing the involvement of the United States in
World War I. Id. at 216.
92. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Defendants of Russian-Jewish nationality were
convicted, under the Espionage Act for publishing two Bolshevik leaflets
"intended to provoke and to encourage resistance to the United States in the
war," id. at 624, as well as to urge "a general strike of workers in ammunition
factories for the purpose of curtailing the production of ordinance and
munitions necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war .... " Id.
93. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland Marshall Fund
Lecture Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 175, 185 (1986)
(explaining that part of the consumer conception of democracy is the fact that
it is driven by self-interested citizen participation influencing constitutional
discourse and decision making); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 6 (1977). Professor Macpherson identifies four liberal
democratic models - the protective model, the developmental model, the
equilibrium model and the participatory model. Id. at 22. All of these models,
though, depend upon the mainspring of human political behavior, which is self
interest. Id. As he states, "liberal democracy, to be workable, must not be far
out of line with the wants and capabilities of the human beings who are to
work with it." Id. at 21. Professor Macpherson further notes that "liberalism
had always meant freeing the individual from the outdated restraints of old
institutions." Id.
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the potential for abusing power, [according to the framers,] was
now in the hands of the people themselves."

94

However, as

mentioned earlier, Federalist humanism was based on the premise

that the mainspring of human conduct was self-interest and this
human trait precluded the people from acting for the collective
interest. 95 An apparent outgrowth from this historical reading of

the Federalist's motivational theory of political behavior, has
resulted in Supreme Court Justices 9 6 and constitutional scholars 97
94. See JOHN P. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AhMRICAN PoLrrcs 78
(Basic Books 1984); see also THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 320
("A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.").
95. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 11, at 410. The Founding
Fathers believed that their principal responsibility was to make sure that their
proposed system of politics would allow for "time and opportunity for more
cool and sedate reflection[,J" the necessary requisite for due deliberation, so
that reason might prevail in their political judgments. Id. In THE FEDERALIST
No. 15, Hamilton notes that "the passions of men will not conform to the
dictates of reason and justice without constraint." Id. at 149; see also
WILLMOORE KENDALL ET. AL., THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL TRADITION (1970). Professor Kendall notes that the scheme of
government embodied in the Constitution reflects a "republican remedy"
without jeopardizing "our supreme symbol as a people: namely, selfgovernment through deliberative processes." Id. at 79.
96. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1968). The Court in
Brandenburg announced an "incitement to imminent lawless action" test as
opposed to Judge Learned Hand's "not improbable" test and Justice Holmes'
"clear and present danger" test to overturn Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927), and thus effectively expanded the scope of free speech protection.
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 454; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, (1951)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas proclaimed in libertarian discourse
that "[flull and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our
faith .... " 1d. at 584-85; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, (1925)
(Holmes and Brandeis JJ., dissenting). Writing in support of libertarian
concept of free speech, the dissenters stated that "[tihe general principle of
free speech... must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in
view of the scope that has been given the word 'liberty ...

.'"

Id. at 673;

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J., dissenting)
(dissenting in libertarian discourse and supporting the further expansion of
protections for free speech).
97. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 593 (1982) (asserting that the principal societal value protected by the
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developing certain freedom of speech theories. These theories
justify the ebb and flow of First Amendment protection
concerning the role of information and advocacy in democratic
government or deliberative politics. 98 During the disposition of
the early Espionage Act cases in 1919, the Court developed the
"clear and present danger" test, 9 9 which would become
instrumental in helping the Court determine how libertarian or
republican it would view the First Amendment protection of free
speech.
Although Justice Holmes agreed with the Court's application of
this test in the earlier Espionage Act and Draft cases, by the time
Abrams v. United States100 came before the Court, Holmes was
becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the republican results
his test was producing. In response, Justice Holmes dissented in
Abrams and introduced his 'marketplace of ideas' theory.101 For
Justice Holmes, the competition of ideas would determine
whether the present ideological underpinnings of the state were
worthy of preservation. Similarly, for Justice Brandeis, the other
libertarian on the Court, the ultimate objective was not the order
itself, but rather, the order necessary to achieve deliberative

First Amendment is to help promote self-realization); C. Edwin Baker, Scope
of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 966
(1978) (freedom of speech based upon a broader libertarian theory than
afforded under the market place theory); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLMCAL FREEDOM 26 (Oxford University Press 1965). The free speech
clause basically serves a political function by promoting the free flow of
information necessary in informing the electorate in public affairs so that they
can carry on the business of self-government. Id.
98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (introducing the
"clear and present danger" test).
100. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
101. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes reformulated the
"clear and present danger" test and based his constitutional theory on the
principal premise that there was to be free trade in ideas, and truth would
become accepted through the competition of the market. Id. He stressed that
only where the circumstances were such that there was no time to expose evil
ideas through more speech, should the state suppress political speech. Id.
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politics of popular government. 102 To Brandeis, the "clear and

present danger" test was an exception to political deliberation. 10 3
Moreover, to further extend these constitutional protections, both
Justices insisted that the "clear and present" evil should be

sufficiently substantial to warrant the inhibition of public debate
or suppression

of street

politics. 104

Interestingly

though,

Schenck, Debs, Frohwerk, Abrams, Gitlow and Whitney were all
sent to jail despite the presence of the "clear and present danger"
test, which had libertarian underpinnings. 10 5 Clearly, where

insurgent or radical politics appear to threaten the state, the test
itself is applied in a republican manner. 10 6 Thus, the

"preservation of the state" principle will always trump the

"deliberative

politics"

principle. 10 7

This

Machiavellian

102. See supra note 86, at 383. Professor Cover observed that in Brandeis'
concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), "Brandeis' most
powerful statements on behalf of liberty of expression had been closely tied to
the political deliberation of popular government, of which the legislative
process was paradigmatic." Id.
103. See Cover, supra note 86, at 381-82. Professor Cover notes that
Justice Brandeis "had confined 'clear and present danger' to the status of an
emergency exception to political deliberation ....Brandeis had not accounted
for the many non-political and informal ways, [i.e., street politics] that
cultures and societies arrive at the truth." Id.
104. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377-78 (Brandeis and Holmes JJ.,
concurring). In 1919, Whitney was convicted of the felony of assisting in
organizing the Communist Labor Party of California, of being a member of it,
and of assembling with it. The Court held that these acts constituted a crime,
because the party was formed to teach syndicalism. Ironically, both Holmes
and Brandeis found the evil presented to be substantial enough to warrant
upholding Whitney's conviction despite their libertarian views on political
speech. Id. at 379.
105. See WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT
50-56 (1965).
106. See Cover supra note 86, at 353. Professor Cover noted that during
the early 20th century, the Court took a very conservative approach in the
disposing of free speech cases because disorderly street politics were viewed as
a primary threat not only to property but to civil society itself. Id.
107. But cf. RONALD DWORKmN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1973).
Professor Dworkin's liberal theory of justice stands for the fundamental
proposition that our constitutional individual rights, secured by the Bill of
Rights, are "trumps" over collective goals.
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jurisprudential approach can be traced throughout the Court's
history.
Not surprisingly, when viewing the libertarian perspectives of
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis, it is possible to see traces of
Machiavellian republican theory. 108 This might explain why
republican results can be produced under a libertarian theory of
justice. 109 In short, the presence of republican theory resonates

108. THE DiscouRsEs, supra note 33, at 162. Justice Holmes' libertarian
dialogue in his dissent in Abrams mirrored Machiavellian liberal dialogue
found in THE DiscouRsEs. Id. See also Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis:
Libertarianand Republican Justificationsfor Free Speech, 4 J. L. & POL. 451
(1988). Professor Lahav noted that Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney was
lodged in republican theory. Id. at 460-61. According to Lahav, Brandeis'
"theory rest[ed] on two central themes: the idea of civic virtue and the idea
that the end of politics (or the state) [was] the common good, which in turn
[was] more than the sum of individual wills." Id. at 461.
109. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Appleton-Century-Crofts & Co.

1947) (1859). Although Justice Holmes's "marketplace of ideas" theory echoes
Mill's utilitarian justifications for free speech as instrumental in arriving at the
truth, Mill also believed that what people ought to be allowed to do varied with
the circumstances. Id. at 75-94. Mill regarded "utility as the ultimate appeal on
all ethical questions." Id. at 10. He stated that "even opinions lose their
immunity, when the circumstances... are such as to constitute... a positive
instigation to some mischievous act." Id. at 55; see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 69 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690). Although

it is traditionally accepted that the American polity was conceived in Lockean
liberalism, even Locke himself admitted that
the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the
establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural
law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of
society, and as far as will consist with the public good of every person
in it.
Id. Therefore, both Mill's and Locke's political philosophies recognized the
ultimate republican good - the preservation of the state itself. Accordingly,
Justice Brandeis' "deliberative politics" model endorses formal legislative
politics as opposed to informal street-corner politics as the principal form of
deliberative politics and thus embraces the Lockean importance of the
majority's duty to preserve the state. Alternatively, Justice Holmes'
"marketplace of ideas" theory, if it has any associational value with Mill's
theory of freedom of speech, must also incorporate the hidden importance of
republican theory found in Mill's discourse. MILL, supra, at 95.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/12

30

1994]

Molander: Machiavellian Jurisprudence

MA CHIA VELLIN JURISPRUDENCE

623

within Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.110
Although Brandeis espoused libertarian constitutionalism, it was
republican constitutionalism that prevailed. Similarly, Holmes'
"clear and present danger" test, even as modified in his dissent in
Abrams, 111 resulted in the Court always being able to elevate the
"preservation of the state" principle above the "deliberative
politics" principle or at least allow the Court to narrowly define
the proper parameters of deliberative politics so that the state's
preservation would always appear to be imminently in danger. In
truth, the "clear and present danger" test would not be an
adequate test to protect political speech, since the Court would
always find the wherewithal during politically discordant times to
protect state interests at the expense of deliberative politics.
Conversely, the "deliberative politics" principle seems to
prevail when the "heated circumstances" surrounding the
occurrence of radical politics have abated. For example, in De
Jonge v. State of Oregon,112 the Court decided in favor of the
"deliberative politics" principle. 113 Obviously, something
happened in between 1927 and 1937 for the De Jonge Court to
side with the "deliberative politics" principle. A valid
explanation can be that the radical politics movement, which was
strongly supported by socialist, communist and syndicalist
elements, was having less and less of an independent impact upon
the American political scene and this process continued well into
the 1930's.114 Quite simply, there was no threat to the state
110. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Lahav, supra note 108, at
461. Professor Lahav noted that Justice Brandeis' "observation that the end of
the state is the individual freedom, joined by his observation that liberty is the
secret of happiness, suggests that in Whitney he posited the common good as
the goal of the American polity." Id.
111. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
112. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
113. Id. at 363-65.

114. See IRA KIPNIs, THE SOCIALIST MOVENMENT 1897-1912, at 429 (1968).
In the 1920's the socialists "concluded that the American big business was here
to stay, and that there more was to be gained by working under it than fighting
it .... ." Id. "The Socialist Party had been organized to combat the institution,
practices, and values of monopoly capitalism; [i]nstead, it had been corrupted
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because the state itself was flexible enough to co-opt the
radicalism of the Left. 115 After 1937 and throughout World War

II, the Court did not substantially decide any significant case law
6 It was not until the
that abrogated freedom of political speech. 11
early 1950s that republican constitutionalism came to the
forefront of the Court's political speech jurisprudence. In 1951,
117
the Court again applied the "clear and present danger" test,
but the application of this liberal test resulted in the republican

principle prevailing.
The second Red Scare provided the Court with the opportunity
to illustrate, once again, its Machiavellian methodological

jurisprudential

approach

in

constraining

political

speech

by them." Id; see also JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN
AMERICA 1912-1925 (1967). Weinstein noted that after the 1924 national
election, the Socialist Party's strength became increasingly anemic. Id. at 324332. As Weinstein wrote, "for another two decades the socialists would
continue to go through the motions but they would never regain their position
as the political center of American radicalism." Id. at 326.
115. See

DAVID SHANNON,

THE SOCIALIST

PARTY

OF AMERICA:

A

HISTORY (1955). Franklin D. Roosevelt's state capitalism of the 1930's led
historian David Shannon to note that "the story of the decline of the Socialist
Party since 1933 is, for the most part, the story of the political success of the
New Deal." Id. at 229. In short, Roosevelt "stole the thunder" of the socialists
by virtue of his progressive politics. Id. at 228.
116. See Emerson, supra note 87, at 975 (noting that during World War II
freedom of speech to oppose the war or criticize its conduct was not seriously
infringed); see also Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943) (reversing the
conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses prosecuted under a wartime state sedition
law for publicly urging people not to support the war and for advocating and
teaching refusal to salute the flag and illustrating the use of the Holmes' test to
cause the triumph of free speech over national security). But see BERNS, supra
note 105, at 56 (1957). Professor Berns noted that "the test as applied in
Taylor actually bec[ame] a rationale for avoiding the impossible prohibitions of
the First Amendment and for convicting persons for speech that the
government ha[d] forbidden." Id.; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942) (developing the "fighting words" doctrine to
proscribe certain political speech).
117. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 514-15 (1951); see also Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (applying the Chaplinsky "fighting
words" test, the Court upheld the conviction of a left-wing college student
engaging in "radical" street-corner politics by calling President Truman a
"bum" and the American Legion a "Nazi Gestapo").
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freedoms. The Court basically imposed a containment policy on
domestic radical politics similar to America's foreign policy of

containment that justified our presence in Korea. Accordingly,
once the apparent threat to the state's ideological underpinnings
again threatened its own survival, the Court's containment policy
dictated the outcome in the Court's decision in Dennis v. United
States. 118
However, six years later, in Yates v. United States,119 the
Court demonstrated a willingness to recognize the importance of
the "deliberative politics" principle and reversed the convictions
of the "second string" of communist leaders who were convicted
under the Smith Act of 1940.120 The circumstances in 1957 were
substantially different from the circumstances in 1951, and a
Machiavellian response required the Court to change its mode of
action to comport with the changing circumstances. 12 1 This was
118. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
119. 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1977).
120. Id. at 338; see also Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger"
Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1163, 1176-78 (1970) (contrasting the different justifications for upholding
convictions under the Smith Act from 1940 to 1968); Robert Mollan, Smith Act
Prosecutions:The Effect of the Dennis and Yates Decisions, 26 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 705 (1965). Professor Mollan observes a common thread in the Court's
analysis in the Dennis and Yates decisions. Id. at 748. He notes that
"[e]xpression in the form of statements of belief, or of passionate desire, or of
fervent expectation might be construed to be related to the creation of attitudes
in an audience which would render susceptible to an incitement to action at
some time in the indefinite future." Id. In other words, the predisposition of
the audience to be induced to act illegally is dispositive to attaining a
conviction under the Smith Act, and given that the fear of communism had
abated by 1957, the effect of the expression of advocacy to violently overthrow
the government did not have the same dispositive effect on the Yates Court as
it had on the Dennis Court. Therefore, Yates was free while Dennis was

jailed. Id.
121. SHIFFRiN, supra note 88, at 30. Professor Shiffrin notes that:
By 1951, anti-communist sentiment was a powerful theme in American
politics. The Soviet Union had detonated a nuclear weapon; Communists
had firm control of the Chinese mainland; the Korean War was at a
stalemate; Alger Hiss had been convicted of perjury in Congressional
testimony concerning alleged spying activities for the Soviet Union
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particularly true where the ultimate common good was not at
stake.
Four years after Yates, however, the Court in Scales v. United
States, 122

again

placed

restraints

upon

political

speech.

Ironically, on that same day, the Court also decided not to act
contrary to the "deliberative politics" principle set forth in Noto
v. United States.123 Obviously, something differed in the two
cases decided by the Court in 1961 to justify dissimilar rulings
concerning violations of the same membership clause in the
Smith Act. That difference can be explained by noting that in
Yates the convictions were against high American Communist
Party officials, whereas in Noto the conviction was against an
unimportant member of the American Communist Party.
Interestingly, the Yates and Noto decisions were sandwiched
between the "Bay of Pigs" fiasco of 1961, and the "Cuban
Missile Crisis" of 1962, both of which occurred not more than
90 miles from the shores of the United States. With the
heightened awareness of a surge in international communism, the
Court reverted to Machiavellian jurisprudence, 124 but this time it
targeted elite members of the American Communist Party. By
1968, at the height of both the Vietnam War and the international
while he was a State Department official; and, Senator Joseph
McCarthy of Wisconsin had created a national sensation by accusation
that many 'card carrying communists' held important State Department
jobs.
Id. at 30-31. Shiffrin observes that in 1954:
Senator McCarthy was censored by the Unites States Senate for acting
contrary to its ethics and impairing its dignity. Also the Korean War
was resolved and by 1957, when the 'second string' of communist
leaders reached the Supreme Court in Yates, McCarthy had died and so
had McCarthyism. Although strong anti-communist sentiment persisted,
the political atmosphere [surrounding the Yates decision in 1957] was
profoundly different from that of Dennis in 1951.
Id. at 44.
122. 367 U.S. 203, 206 (1961).
123. 367 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1961).
124. See GALLUP POLL, Public Opinion 1935-1971 (vol. III 1959-1971)
(1972); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text. Machiavelli alluded to
the courts as being prince-like institutions that would hold the people in line.
Id.
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battle of ideologies, 125 another political speech case, United
States v. O'Brien,12 6 reached the court. O'Brien involved the
convictions of David O'Brien and three companions who burned
their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the
South Boston Courthouse. The Court upheld the convictions
stating that "[w]hen O'Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his

registration certificate, he willfully frustrated [the government's]
interest."127
However, one year later the Court trumped the "first
amendment republican principle" with the "first amendment
liberal principle." 12 8 What had changed in one year? 12 9 A valid
125. See WALTER LAFER, AMRmCA, RUSSIA, AND THE COLD WAR,
1945-1971 (1972) [hereinafter COLD WAR]. Professor Lafeber noted that
President Johnson raised the American troop level in Vietnam to 535,000
during the summer of 1968. Id. at 293. This was the highest figure that
American military personnel would reach during the Johnson administration.
Id. During the summer of 1968, Soviet party leader Leonid Brezlmev
proclaimed the "Brezhnev Doctrine" under which Soviet intervention in
socialist states was justified because socialist nations had the right to save other
socialists from "world imperialism" and the "counter revolution" to preserve
the "indivisible" socialist system. Id.; see also THOhAS W. WOLFE, SOVIET

POWER AND EUROPE, 1945-1970 (1970). Professor Wolfe noted that since
1964, and even before President Johnson escalated the fighting in Vietnam, the
Soviets rejected numerous American overtures for better East-West relations.
Id. at 266-69.
126. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
127. Id. at 382.
128. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In this decision the Court
combined the most speech protective aspects of Holmes's "clear and present
danger" test with Judge Learned Hand's "advocacy/incitement" test which
Hand formulated in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1917), which in effect gives double protection to political speech.
Id. at 447. Under the Brandenburg standard, direct advocacy of imminent
unlawful action that would likely incite or produce an unlawful response is
proscriptive speech. Id. However, governmental restraints on the advocacy of
abstract doctrines will not be a legitimate governmental speech proscription.
Id. at 448.
129. See, e.g., GALLUP, supra note 124. A gallup poll taken in 1968 in
which Americans were asked whether or not they were "Hawks" - standing for
increasing America's military effort in Vietnam, or "Doves" - reducing
America's military effort in Vietnam revealed associational values of 61% and
23%, respectively. Id. at 2105-06. However, in 1969, a gallup poll revealed
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explanation can be constructed from the fact that by 1969
national sentiment was against our involvement in the Vietnam
War. 130 In effect, the national election of 1968 legitimized
criticism of the war to the extent that the major political party
platforms were based upon promises of honorably ending the
Vietnam War. In other words, the American political consensus
endorsed the position that the state's interests were best served by
ending U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict. 13 1 Essentially,

all government institutions began to recognize and accept
criticism of the war as part of the deliberation process.
Consequently, the street politics of anti-war protesting began to
enjoy greater liberal First Amendment protection. 132
In 1971, the Court was faced with another political speech
case, Cohen v. California.133 By this time, however, the Court
had embraced the "deliberative politics" principle. The
that Americans were 59% in agreement that America should reduce troop
levels in Vietnam as opposed to 25% in disagreement. Id. at 2199. And later
that year, 57% agreed to the introduction of a congressional proposal to
withdraw from Vietnam and to turn over Vietnam's defense to the Vietnamese.
Id. at 2218.
130. See COLD WAR, supra note 125. Professor Lafeber alluded to the fact
that national sentiment was not only against the war, but precipitated President
Nixon, in the summer of 1969, to introduce his "Asian Doctrine" in which the
President said that the United States expected Asians to defend themselves
against Communism while American troops slowly withdrew from the whole
Western Pacific region. Id. at 282.
131. See THE WORLD ALMANAC 525 (Mark S. Hoffman ed., 1993) (noting
that the United States initiated troop withdrawal in July 1969, and President
Nixon set Vietnaminization policy on November 3, 1969).
132. See COLD WAR, 1945-1971, supra note 125, at 295-296. Professor
Lafeber stated that, by 1971, the politics of the "New Left" to end America's
involvement in Vietnam was greatly supported by most Americans. Id. WORLD
ALMANAC, supra note 131, at 525 (noting that Anti-Vietnam War
demonstrations reached a peak in the United States in 1969, and on November
15, some 250,000 antiwar demonstrators marched in Washington, D.C.);
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (reversing the conviction of
a black anti-war activist who threatened President Johnson's physical wellbeing); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508-10 (1969) (upholding the right of students to wear black armbands in
protest of the Vietnam War while in school).
133. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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circumstances that gave rise to Cohen's conviction were that he
had worn a jacket bearing the plainly visible words 'Fuck the
Draft' in a Los Angeles courthouse. 134 He testified that he did so
as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings

against the Vietnam War and the draft. 13 5 In reversing Cohen's
conviction, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, echoed
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Witney13 6 He stressed that the
First Amendment's principal function is to "remove
for
the
arena
of
public
governmental
restraints
discussion .... " 13 7 Since 1971 the Court has consistently
expanded the protections for political speech. 13 8 An affirmation
of this observation can be evidenced in Texas v. Johnson,13 9 and
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id.
136. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927).
137. 403 U.S. at 24.
138. See COLD WAR, 1945-1971, supra note 125, at 301 (1971). Professor
Lafeber ends his study by noting that the evacuation during the Vietnam War
ended a quarter of a century of Cold War foreign policies of the United States,
Russia and China. Id.; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
The Rankin Court reversed the dismissal of a government clerical worker for
making the comment, after John Hinckley's attempted assassination of
President Reagan, that "if they go for him again, I hope they get him." Id. at
381-83. The Court viewed the speech as falling within the realm of "public
concern" or "deliberative politics" and was therefore protected. Id. at 386;
Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 442-43 (1974). The
Court invalidated an Indiana statute that required a political party or its'
candidates signing an affidavit stating that they do "not advocate the overthrow
of local, state or national government by force or violence ....Id.; Hess v.

Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). The Hess Court reversed convictions growing
out of a campus anti-war demonstration which overflowed onto the public
streets causing a public disturbance. Id. at 109. Although the demonstrators
were moved off the street, they threatened to "take the fucking street later."
Id. at 107. The state unsuccessfully argued that this statement was proscriptive
speech under the Brandenburg standard. Id. at 108-09. But see Connick v.
Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), in which the Court, in reviewing speech by an
Assistant District Attorney concerning the manner in which government is
operated or should be operated, specifically the District Attorney's office,
upheld the dismissal of the Assistant District Attorney. Id. at 154. This juristic
assessment is analogous to the Court's liberal constitutional approach in Noto,
as opposed to the Court's republican constitutional approach in Scales.
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Eichman v. United States,140 decided respectively in 1989 and
1990.
In Johnson, the defendant, while demonstrating at the
Republican National Convention in 1984, unfurled the American
flag and torched it. 14 1 The central issue before the Court was
whether burning a nationally venerated object was protected
speech. 142 In a five-to-four decision the Court reversed the
conviction of Johnson. 143 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
stated that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable." 144
However, the dissent of Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom
Justice White and Justice O'Connor joined, resonates with
republican theory. Rehnquist stated that:
the American flag, has occupied a unique position as the symbol
of our Nation, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental
prohibition against flag burning .... then, throughout more than
200 years of our history, has come to be the visible symbol
embodying our Nation .... the flag is not simply another 'idea'
or 'point of view' competing for recognition in the marketplace
of ideas. Millions and millions of Americans regard it with an
almost mystical reverence .... For that flag every true
American has not simply an appreciation but a deep affection. 145

139. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the conviction of a defendant for
publicly burning the American flag as a means of political protest was
inconsistent with the guarantees of the First Amendment).
140. 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding that the burning of the American flag
falls within the protective cloak of the First Amendment).
141. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. While the flag burned, the protesters
assembled to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and of certain
Dallas-based corporations, chanted: "America, the red, white, and blue, we
spit on you." Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at420.

144. Id. at 414.
145. Id. at 422, 429 (quoting Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41 (1907)).
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To Rehnquist and his followers, the burning of the flag was an
14 6
unvirtuous act punishable by the state.

Similarly, in Eichman,147 the Court struck down the Flag
Protection Act as unconstitutional because the Act "criminally
proscribe[d] expressive conduct because of its likely
communicative impact." 14 8 Again Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Stevens, Justice White and Justice O'Connor dissented
and argued that the government's "legitimate interest in

protecting the symbolic value of the American flag" outweighed
the free speech interest. 149 In short, it was unpatriotic to bum the
American flag. Furthermore, since the government had the duty

to promote patriotic and virtuous acts that preserved our symbol
of nationhood and national unity, this act was within the

proscriptive limits of legitimate governmental restraint. 150
Today, with our leaders and the public both believing our
nation to be relatively

free of the danger

of foreign

146. Id. at 422. But see Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On
Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (1990). Michelman, a
modem day civic-republican, posits that flag burning as not "paradigmatically
antithetical to [the] constitutional communitarian aspiration [,] ... [because]
the flag burner may be said to affirm an ideal vision of a possible nation whose
identity is under contention... [and] Constitutions... are made of
contention, all the way down." Id. at 1362-63; see also supra note 34, at 13964 (Machiavelli noting the importance of secular religion in unifying a nation).
147. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
148. Id. at 318. The Court, in response to the contention that the Act was
spurred by a "national consensus" in favor of a prohibition on flag burning,
stated that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more
weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows in foreign to the First
Amendment. Id.
149. Id. at 319.
150. Id. at 321-22. Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens refers to his
opinion in Johnson, where he discussed the historical symbolism that the
American flag possesses. Id. But see Kent Greenawalt, O'Er the Land of the
Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37 UCLA L. REV. 925 (1990). Professor
Greenawalt posits that "Johnson did not really question that the flag stands for
nationhood and that nationhood exists; rather, he challenged the desirability of
our concept of nationhood." Id. at 946. Further, Professor Greenawalt notes
that a constitutional amendment to protect against flag desecration should not
be adopted, reasoning that "[t]he Bill of Rights, like the flag, has a traditional
status not to be tampered with lightly." Id.
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152

other
substantial evil, the Court gives greater protection to political
speech than at any time previously. As seen in the dissents in
Johnson and Eichman, there is a political philosophical strain of
republicanism on the Bench. Whether or not the republican
"preservation of the state" principle will someday trump the
liberal "deliberative politics" principle as the theoretical basis for
imposing republican constitutionalism will depend on the
changing circumstances. More importantly, given the fact that
there is still a strong presence of classical republican thought
15 3
within our institutions, particularly the Supreme Court,
libertarian decisions concerning political speech are not a
guarantee. 15 4
of democracy,

or any

151. See, e.g., WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 131, at 521. The influx of
"radical politics" resulted in about 250 alien radicals being deported on
December 22, 1919; and, eventually led to over 2,700 communists, anarchists
and other radicals being arrested during January-May in 1920. Id. Immigration
rates between the years 1905 to 1921 were an unprecedented total in U.S.
immigration history. Id. It eventually forced Congress to sharply curb
immigration by establishing a national origins quota system on May 19, 1921.
Id.
152. See GALLUP POLL, Public Opinion 1935-1971 (vol. II 1949-1958)
(1972). In 1951 55% of the American people favored sending American troops
overseas to help fight communism. Id. at 961. In 1951, three times as many
Americans believed the Russians were winning the Cold War. Id. at 963.
However, by 1957, 50% of Americans favored closer relations with the
Russians. Id. at 1494-95. But see GALLUP, supra note 124, at 1704. In 1961
and 1962, Americans again believed that Russia was winning the propaganda
war. Id. These statistics reflect the "political mood" of the country was on a
roller coaster ride and, not surprisingly, so were the Court's decisions during
this period.
153. See, e.g., Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Scalia and Thomas dissented in the decision of the Court which upheld
leafleting at airports, and ominously noting that:
[A]t some future date the Port Authority may be able to reimpose a
complete ban, having developed evidence that enforcement of a
differential ban is burdensome. Until now it has had no reason or means
to do this, since it is only today that such a requirement has been
announced.
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The tenuous position that liberal constitutionalism holds in
American jurisprudence has been highlighted by the present
court's inclination to decide cases in a republican fashion. 15 5
Recently, in Forsyth County, Georgiav. NationalistMovement1 5 6

actual traces of classical republican constitutional principle can
still be found in the dictum of important members on the Bench.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia and Thomas,

in their dissenting opinion noted that "we perceive no
constitutional ground for denying to local governments that
flexibility of adjustment of fees which in the light of varying
conditions would tend to conserve rather than impair the liberty
sought."157
Contemporary
republican constitutionalism's
concern, therefore, is mainly one that promotes the stability and
conserves the system that liberty presumably relies upon. 15 8

154. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (reversing the
Tennessee Supreme Court the Court held that only political speech, of all
forms of speech, is proscribed at a polling place); see also InternationalSoc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2701. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
delivering the opinion of the Court upheld a Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey regulation forbidding solicitation of money, reasoning that airports
are non-public fora because they do not fall under the traditional categories of
public fora since they are recent travel developments. Id. But see Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 7475 (1964) ("For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression;
it is the essence of self-government."), overruled by Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Central Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989). The Court stated that "the First Amendment 'has its
fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for
public office." Id. (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
(1971)).
155. See Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1846; Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2701.
156. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
157. Id. at 2406 (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577
(1941)).
158. See supra notes 40, 43 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The Court has been very adept at concealing its Machiavellian
pattern of jurisprudence 159 concerning constitutional protections
of political speech. In fact, the Court's pattern of political speech
"man/beast"
Machiavelli's
has
mirrored
jurisprudence
160
effort to
evident
in
the
Court's
This parallelism is
metaphor.
dilute the further protection of political speech provided by the
overbreadth doctrine 61 or, by the Court's development of
subsidiary proscriptive doctrines that can be applied to achieve
republican results. 16 2
As Machiavelli pointed out, prince-like institutions must mix
the personalities of the fox and the lion so as to achieve their
159. THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 71. Machiavelli stresses that:
[e]veryone sees how you appear, few touch what you are; and these few
dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of the state
to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of [princelike institutions], where there is no [higher institution] to appeal to, one
looks to the end. So let a prince win and maintain his state; the means
will always be judged honorably, and will be praised by everyone.
Id.
160. THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 69. Machiavelli introduces the
"man/beast" metaphor:
[Tihere are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other with force.
The first is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is
often not enough, one must have recourse to the second. Therefore, it is
necessary for a [prince-like institution] to know well how to use the
beast and the man ....

Thus, since a [prince-like institution] is

compelled of necessity to know well how to use the beast, [it] should
pick the fox and the lion, because the lion does not defend itself from
snakes and the fox does not defend itself from the wolves. So one needs
to be a fox to recognize snakes and a lion to frighten wolves. Those who
stay simply with the lion do not understand this.
Id.
161. See Arnett v. Kentucky, 416 U.S. 134, 158-64 (1974) (furthering the
substantial requirement by generally stating that a significant degree of
overbreadth is necessary to meet the substantiality requirement); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (stating the requirement that the
overbreadth not only be real, but substantial compared with the legitimate
application of the government restraint).
162. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
("fighting words" doctrine).
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ultimate end, that of the preservation of the state. In retrospect,
one can argue that 1919-27, 1951, 1961 and 1968 were years
demonstrating examples where the Court has acted in the
personality of the lion. Since 1969 the Court has acted in the
personality of the fox. As previously mentioned, one of the ways
the Court has done this has been through its efforts to limit the
legal force of the overbreadth doctrine. But the Court has also
derogated the protections of the First Amendment by developing
corollary proscriptive speech doctrines that have eviscerated the
legal and substantive protections of the free speech clause. 163
Thus, by doing this the Court has used the first Machiavellian
form of combat - the law. 164 Prior to 1969, where the Court had
to confront the wolves of socialism and communism, the Court
found it necessary to take on the personality of the lion and
resorted to the second Machiavellian form of combat, namely,
force. 165 It has done this by legitimizing the repressive forms of
governmental restraints on political speech. Conclusively, where
the Court has acted as the lion it has applied abrogating
principles of justice. Where the court has acted as the fox,
however, the Court has employed derogative principles of
justice.
James Madison stated that "[i]f men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary." 16 6 Similarly, Machiavelli noted that "if all men were
good, this teaching would not be good; but because they are

163. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (unwilling listener
doctrine); Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S.
271 (1984) (no right to be heard guaranteed by the First Amendment); Heffron
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(reasonable time, place and manner regulations are constitutional even in true
public forums); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1978)
(captive audience doctrine).
164. THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 69.

165. Id.
166. THE FEDERALIsT PAPERs, supra note 11, at 319.
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wicked and do not observe faith with the [state], [the state] also
does not have to observe faith with them." 167
Obviously, the United States Supreme Court, in an institutional
sense, has found the teachings of Machiavelli to be good.
Justifiably, at least to Machiavelli and as reflected in the Court's
pattern of political speech jurisprudence, the Court felt it
"[needed] to have a spirit disposed to change as the winds of
fortune and variations of things commanded.., not to depart
from good.., but know how to enter evil, when forced by

necessity." 168
Garth Molander

167. THE PRINCE, supra note 69, at 69; THE DiscouRsEs, supra note 33, at
111-12 ("[I]n constituting and legislating for a commonwealth it must be taken
for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the
malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers.').
168. Id. at 70.
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